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ABSTRACT
Information technology outsourcing (ITO) research as a genre is presently in a
relatively youthful state since it began last decade. As yet, there is no consistently adopted
definition of what ITO is and little agreement over what forms it takes. This paper takes the
concept of ITO configuration, the structural taxonomy of outsourcing arrangements, as a lens to
examine major ITO contracts in seven large organizations. The study contributes insights
gained from seven cases to better understand the complexity of the phenomenom and assist
organizations in forming and managing their ITO arrangements. The primary contribution of
this paper is its demonstration that outsourcing is more about complex choices than has ever
been recognized in the prior literature, and that the configuration structures adopted offer
explanations and insight into success and failure depending upon how the chose configuration
was managed by the client organization.
Keywords: IT Outsourcing, Configuration, Structural Taxonomy, Case Research
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INTRODUCTION – THE PROBLEM

ITO (information technology outsourcing) research is plagued with a real issue over a
common understanding of what ITO is and the forms it can take. Thus a range of studies place
very different emphases and often exhibit contesting definitions (for example compare Loh and
Venkatraman, (1992), Martinsons, (1993), Oh, (2005), Kern et al. (200a) Susarla et al. (2003),
Dibbern, (2004), Fitzgerald and Willcocks, (1994) Kern, 1997), Apte et al. (1997), Hirschheim
and Lacity, 2000). The forms outsourcing takes, whether ‘partnerships’ ‘value-added deals’,
‘equity holdings’ ‘joint venture’ or some such, have also been labeled in widely differing ways
(compare for example Millar (1994), Klepper and Jones (1998), Lacity and Willcocks (1998),
Currie (1998), Lee et al. (2004), Martinsons (1993), Hackney (1999) and Grover et al. (1996),
Dibbern et al. (2004), Ang and Cummings (1997) and Lee et al. (2004).If nothing else, ITO
research needs a common dictionary!
Further, explicitly intentional structural variants have also distinguished the ITO
phenomenon under study. For example, Gallivan and Oh’s (1999) conclusion was there are
more options than the traditional dyad (one buyer, one seller), supported by Cullen et al. (2001)
finding that only 24% of Australian organizations have a dyadic arrangement, the rest
outsourced to multiple suppliers under various forms of agreement. Nonetheless, recent studies,
for example Lee et al. (2004) intentionally exclude all but a simple dyad from their research
even though a multiple vendor approach was adopted by the first ITO case study, Kodak, in
having IBM operate its data centers while DEC operated its telecommunication systems
(Applegate and Montealegre, 1991).
As another example, consider the conflicting advice over long-term versus short-term
contracts. Earl (1996) believes the uncertainty involving IT and the requirement to experiment
in its application precludes having long-term contracts. Klepper and Jones (1998) argue that
long-term contracts enable the supplier to learn about the organization and for the parties to
establish mutual trust. Lacity and Willcocks (1998) found that short-term contracts yielded
greater cost savings and Lee et al. (2004) found the reverse. However, all these studies assume
a single-term, fixed-duration contracts, which have not been the norm for some time (Cullen et
al. 2005). Another example of problematic classifications is categorization over the degree of
outsourcing performed. Lacity and Willcocks (1998; 2001), Sambamurthy et al. (2001), and
Stewart et al. (2002) suggest that “selective” is more successful than “total” outsourcing, the
latter being where at least 80% of the IT budget is outsourced to a single supplier. However,
Rouse et al. (2001) report that the probabilities for those engaged in selective outsourcing were
statistically no different—for cost savings or for business flexibility, likewise, Lee et al. (2004)
All this exemplifies that ITO research remains quite exploratory and may benefit from
framing the phenomenon such that continued research can begin to have common constructs.
This is what we attempt in the study that follows.

2

THE STUDY

2.1

Research Question

In identifying the gaps in the ITO literature regarding ITO structures, the need for a
classification scheme, or taxonomy, is evident. A recent study (Cullen et al 2005) was the first
to propose a structural taxonomy, called “configuration”, as the set of possible alternatives and a
common base for describing the type of outsourcing under study (briefly explained in section
2.2). That paper set out the classification scheme which reflects the few dimensions it takes to
describe the structural ‘surface’ (Miller, 1996), in this case the ‘surface’ being an ITO deal.
This paper uses that taxonomy to compare and contrast different outsourcing arrangements in
seven case studies
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The research question posed in this paper is: Does the configuration taxonomy offer

useful insight into success and issues with ITO?

2.2

The Configuration Taxonomy

The configuration taxonomy used in this paper was derived from analysis of 49 ITO
outsourcing projects (Cullen et al. 2005). Table 1 shows the seven attributes. In various papers,
various prior researchers have discussed the importance of all seven attributes. With the
exception of a recent papers by Lee et al. (2004) and Dibbern et al. (2004), none of these studies
has drawn attention to the huge range of options available, nor their management consequences.
Table 1: Configuration Attributes
[1] Scope
Grouping

Attribute

Facet or Option
Service Scope
Recipient Scope
Geographic Scope

[2] Supplier
Grouping

Sole Supplier
Prime Contractor
Best of Breed

[6] Resource
Ownership

[5] Duration

[3]
[4] Pricing FinanFramework cial
Scale

Panel (of preferred
suppliers)
Relative
Absolute
Lump Sum/ Fixed Price
Unit-based
Cost-based
Single Term
Rollover Terms
Evergreen Term
Infrastructure
Onsite
Service & facility
Asset Buy-in
Facility host
Labor
Total outsourcing

[7] Commercial
Relationship

Arms-length
Value add
Co-sourced
Equity

Description
Logical work segmentation
Business groups specifically identified to receive, or
specifically excluded from, services
Physical locations that receive the service
Single service provider that provides all outsourced services,
no subcontracting
Head service provider subcontracts work but is accountable
for all outsourced services
Multiple suppliers, each providing unique services, as well as
overlapping services
Multiple service providers providing similar services under
continuous competition
The % of operating spend represented by the outsourcing
portfolio
The per annum value of the outsourcing portfolio
Lump sum price over specified parameters
Price per specific transaction unit
Actual costs plus a percentage mark up or fixed management
fee
Fixed one term deals
Fixed initial term with options to extend. Extension can be
automatic (parties must agree not to extend) or on notice
(extension must be agreed or contract terminates)
No defined contract expiry date, either party can invoke
various termination rights
Supplier/s provides asset and facilities
Supplier/s provides labor and assets
Supplier/s provides facilities and labor
Supplier/s provides assets only
Supplier/s provides facility only
Supplier/s provides workforce and/or management only
All resources are provided by supplier/s
Independent parties for which the relationship is solely
transactional
Independent parties with a combination of arms-length
contract/s and shared business initiatives
Independent parties providing a mix of service labor and
assets, with integrated end accountability
Related entities providing services to one another or through a
combined entity

Each configuration attribute represents a category of structural choices an organization
is faced with in every ITO deal, for which there are 26 total choices. The choices within each
category are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a single deal can employ all three
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price frameworks – some work may be under a fixed lump sum, some may be under a unit price,
and other charges billed under a cost/+ arrangement. Likewise with resource ownership – some
services may be labor only, others total outsourcing. Nonetheless, each of the 26 choices within
the seven attributes has different advantages, disadvantages, and unique management issues
discussed in depth in Cullen et al. (2005).
By identifying attributes of ITO structural configuration, then exploring their interaction
and unique management requirements, it is possible to go beyond the approach of one variable
at a time criticized by Miller (1996). One can begin to identify the need for organizing the
arrangement and management of many variables.

2.3

Research Method

Case research was chosen as the method because the phenomenon is broad and
complex, because the research was intended to be holistic in-depth investigation, and because
organizational context was deemed very important – all characteristics for which case research
has been deemed useful (Dubé and Paré, 2003). Case research has been established as well
suited for information systems research, where the interest is organizational issues as opposed to
technical issues (Benbasat et al. 1987).
The cases were chosen for theoretical sampling, accordingly no deliberate sampling
plan was designed other than to invite large IT-using firms from Australia to participate. Seven
of 14 invited organizations agreed to participate. These organizations represented five different
industries: Communications and transport services (1), Conglomerate of multiple industries (2),
Manufacturing (1), Mining (1), and State-based government department (2).
The size of the operations ranged from $US 2 billion to $22 billion in per annum
revenue and from 7,800 to 51,000 employees (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Organization Size
Size - FTEs
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The seven contracts that make up the cases were signed in the years 1999 to 2003.
Financially, the contracts represented $261 million in total annual spend, with an average value
of $37 million per annum. The contracts represented 15% to 80% of the organization’s total
ICT (information communication and technology) spend and 40% to 100% of the total
outsourcing spend. The duration of the contracts was between one and nine years. Scope
ranged from the ongoing supply of hundreds of body-shop application coders to whole-of-IT
deals. The geographic coverage ranged from state-based deals to global operations. All were
either 1st generation (first time outsourced) to 2nd generation (with a handover from the
previous supplier to a new one).
The evidence collected in the cases involved multiple data collection methods including
questionnaires, interviews, and archival sources. In each firm, detailed semi-structured
interviews were conducted with the both the CIO and the top contract manager responsible for
the contract at the firm’s headquarters to limit the reliance on a single source of evidence.
Digitally recorded and transcribed interviews of two to four hours each were conducted based
on a nine-page questionnaire, developed from three prior surveys (Cullen, 1994:1997; Cullen et
1291
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al., 2001). Before use, the questionnaire for the cases was pilot-tested with a former CIO to
ensure completeness and ease of response. In addition, documentation was sighted such as
contracts, correspondence, bids, and performance evaluations. Field notes were kept as a
“stream-of-consciousness” commentary during the interviews (Van Maanen, 1985). These were
triangulated with the completed questionnaire forms and the interview transcriptions.

2.4

Configuration of the Cases

Table 2 summarizes the ITO configuration for the largest current ITO deal within the
seven organizations.
Table 2: ITO Configuration of the Largest Deal

1. Scope
Grouping

Case

1
MAN1

2
SERV1

3
MIN1

4
GOV1

5
GOV2

Service

Whole of
IT

Apps
development

Whole of
IT

Note
book
mgmt

Single
app
development

Recipient
Geographic

2. Supplier Grouping
3. FinRelative
ancial
Scale
Absolute
4. Pricing
Framework
5. Contract Duration
(years)
6. Resource ownership
7. Commercial
Relationship

Parent and
subsidiaries

Parent, all
All units, all
units &
All schools
spin offs
subsidiaries

6
CON1
All IT excep
networks &
apps

Parent

Parent and
subsidiaries

7
CON2
Data center
facility,
equip, &
ops
Parent,
subsidiaries
optional

National

National

Global

State

State

National

National

Sole

Best of
Breed

Prime

Prime

Sole

Sole

Sole

80%

15%

33%

26%

$40M

$30M

$133M

Fixed

Unit

Hybrid

Fixed (5)
Supplier all
Arms
length

23%

25%

$31M

Not
tracked
$1M

$16M

$10M

Unit

Fixed

Fixed

Fixed

Rollover
Rollover Rollover
Fixed (1)
(6+ TBD)
(7+1+1)
(3+3)
Supplier – Supplier - Supplier – Supplier – Supplier –
labor
all
labor
labor
all
CoValue
Arms
CoValue
sourcing
add
length
sourcing
add
Fixed (5)

3

CONFIGURATION INSIGHTS FROM THE CASES

3.1

Case 1 (MAN1)

Rollover
(3+2)
Supplier all
Arms
length

MAN1 (Case 1) is a national diversified manufacturer of packing products with nearly
8,000 staff. It is one of the world's largest packaging companies, with annual sales of around
US$7 billion and 242 plants in 40 countries. Manufacturing firms have long ago outsourced
sub-assembly and finished products (Klepper and Jones, 1998). Thus, outsourcing the entire
shop to one supplier made sense to MAN1, to enable it to focus on its core business. It never
considered alternatives. In 2001, after a competitive tendering process, a contract was awarded
to a service provider, for which MAN1 would be its first Australian client.
As a result of poor performance and extensive disputes, the contract was terminated
early in 2003 and a new service provider brought in. The supplier’s poor performance was
1
driven by lack of experience and financial losses. The service scope was whole-of-IT [1] ,
financial scale [3] was 80% of the ICT budget, and resource ownership [6] moved all resources
to the single supplier [2]. These three configuration attributes, in particular for the first
1

The numbers in square brackets [...] correspond to the seven configuration attributes.
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generation (first-time outsourcing), necessitates a diligent supplier selection and management
program. But MAN1 did not understand the risks of the attributes chosen and how to manage
them. They picked a new, and inevitably unviable, supplier without the necessary experience,
as well as without installing their own requisite governance and safety guards. The fixed price
nature of the deal [4] resulted in the supplier being unable to cover costs, let alone make a profit,
thus suffering from the Winner’s Curse (Kern et al., 2002). This, coupled with the supplier’s
inability to attract any other clients, caused its demise. The arms-length relationship [7] caused
it to be too far-gone before the parties began being honest with one another. Duration [5] was
irrelevant; it was terminated well before expiry.
The same configuration for the second-generation deal experienced far superior results.
This time MAN1 knew that having that particular combination of configuration attributes
required careful planning, selection, and management. It had two teams of lawyers, used
scenario and behavior testing to select the service provider, as well as extensive viability
assessments, and put in place an experienced management team.

3.2

Case 2 (SERV1)

SERV1 (Case 2) is a government-owned business enterprise of 35,000 staff providing
the postal, logistics, retailing, and financial services. It outsources 35% of its total ICT spend.
The particular contract used in the case was for applications development, implementation, and
support [1] comprises 43% of the outsourcing spend [3]. It always adopts a multiple supplier
approach [2] to its portfolio configuration. This deal was no different in that two suppliers were
given the work. Basically, in 2000, the CIO made a “take it or leave it” offer to two of its 28
incumbent application developers. “Give me as much labor as I need for a fixed hourly rate of
10% more than what it costs me now in-house.” They both grabbed it.
In terms of configuration, the deal should have worked well. The financial scale [3] and
duration [5] made it attractive to the suppliers, who leapt at the offer. Rationalizing from 28 to
two best of breed suppliers [2] was anticipated to provide economies of scale and knowledge as
well as maintain competition. Limiting the service scope [1] to only applications development,
as well as the financial scale [3] to 15% of the ICT budget, also limited the risk of failure
causing significant harm. The co-sourcing approach [7] was designed so that the three parties
would become seamless – particularly since SERV1 required both the suppliers to work as one
for each development. This being a pure labor contract [6] meant that, in the event of failure,
switching costs were not a significant barrier to terminating the agreement. SERV1 had good
outcomes across the board according to the CIO. However, other stakeholders had another
story.
In this case, the co-sourcing approach [7] did not lead to the seamless service delivery
SERV1 envisioned; it led to accountability confusion. SERV1’s staff believed the suppliers
were to provide development as well as project management methodologies and leadership; the
suppliers understood they were to provide only “bodies” to follow the directions of SERV1.
The vacuum created has yet to be solved. Things were also inadequate from the business units’
perspectives (recipient scope [1]). The units, accustomed to playing any of the 28 prior
suppliers off against each other in the form of a panel, were forced to use the two. They looked
upon this as IT trying to run the business, and where possible, subverted the agreements and
used other suppliers. This, and other events, led to a coup by the business units and the CIO
being terminated.

3.3

Case 3 (MIN1)

MIN1 (Case 3) is the world's largest diversified resources company with some 35,000
employees working in more than 100 operations in approximately 20 countries. The major
businesses are in aluminum, coal, copper, ferro-alloys, iron ore and titanium minerals, as well as
substantial interests in oil, gas, liquefied natural gas, nickel, diamonds, and silver.
The Board of this major global resources firm issued a directive to all management,
“Get out of anything not core business, and get cash sales for LOBs (lines of business)”. As a
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result, MIN1 sold their wholly owned IT subsidiary to a supplier, and in return, the supplier
received a long-term deal for all IT services across the globe.
The deal was essentially configured for maximum sale price, hence the full service,
geographic and recipient scope [1], sole supplier [2], large financial scale [3], long duration [5],
and total transfer of all resources [6]. The only change from the previous generation was the
move from an ‘equity relationship’ to a ‘value-add’ one [7]. Management of the entirety of the
configuration, while not easy, was conducted well as the client was experienced in all the
attributes.
However, the parties faced a major upheaval when the company was reorganized and
split off into separate businesses a year after the contract was signed. Changing the recipient
scope [1] to cover the now independent companies under the old contract has become the
primary focus of the contract management work. Furthermore, due to inconsistent global
capabilities and quality of the supplier coupled with varying organizational requirements of each
region, the contract is now renegotiated every day somewhere in the world evolving, in effect,
into 50 different geographically based contracts. Due to the focus on operational issues, all
initial strategic and innovation goals have been reserved for another day.

3.4

Case 4 (GOV1)

GOV1 (Case 4) is responsible for education in the state and has 51,000 employees. The
Department has been outsourcing for some time, tending to use multiple suppliers [2] based on
regional capabilities [2]. It typically has 30 contracts in place at any given time covering
approximately 60% of its IT budget [3], but has 120 firms and 300 technicians “on the books”
from which to choose [2]. Worth noting, in this case, is that the CIO came from a senior role in
a major supplier. His experience led to the underlying principle that “you should never
outsource knowledge as it is the bridge between business and technology…if you outsource that,
the connection is broken.” Accordingly, GOV1 will bring in best-of-breed expertise as
required, but has a focus with regard to outsourcing on out-tasking – “doers only” [1]. This
“out-tasking” paradigm also has driven both to outsourcing only the labor component of the
Resource Ownership configuration [6], without consideration for other options.
The case contract is GOV1’s only sole supplier arrangement [2] and it concerns the
purchase, installation, and support (helpdesk, maintenance, and warranties of 40,000 notebook
[1] over three years [5]. It was the largest of its kind in the country (unnamed for refereeing
purposes) when signed in 2001. The deal was configured as a sole supplier [2], statewide
contract [1] to gain economies of scale, but the service scope [1] excluded maintenance to give
regional suppliers the benefit from such work. The unit price [4] was fixed per notebook, for
budgeting ease.
GOV1 received value for money far beyond their expectations, and they expected that
the rollover extension would result in another price decrease. However, due to the limited
service scope [1], support to the users was to be provided in-house. This was unplanned, and so
GOV1’s IT people were forced to reactively support the technology adoption process, and not
the strategic activities they had hoped, and GOV1 has not been able to evolve the expertise of
users.

3.5

Case 5 (GOV2)

GOV 2 (Case 5) is the state’s largest Government department and employs over 12,000
people directly and over 80,000 people indirectly through organizations such as hospitals and
aged care facilities, ambulance services and community service agencies. GOV2 outsources
only 10% of its IT shop [3] and has 225 contracts in place [2] covering applications
development and support, as well as systems integration, strategic planning and training [1]. It
outsources only where it does not have the capability or the resources. GOV2 chose to create
panels of pre-qualified suppliers and has also set in place a rule that all suppliers must be chosen
from those panels. So, based on that decision, the Supplier Grouping configuration [2] has been
predetermined as a panel.
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The particular development project used for the case was for the development of new
technology to enable the analysis of lab results and fast recall of food and products [1] and was
a one-year deal [5]. Everything GOV2 had wanted to achieve was done beyond their
expectations. Success was due to a combination of two configuration factors, co-sourcing [7],
and fixed price [4]. Co-sourcing created an attitude of “we were proactive; we wanted the
supplier to succeed”, and the supplier’s staff were co-located at the GOV2’s facilities and direct
open communications and frequent meetings were the norm.
The fixed price nature of the deal put all risk of cost overruns on the supplier. Unlike
MAN1, whose supplier could not afford those overruns, this supplier could – and did. The
supplier’s ingestion of the substantial overruns, and the resultant successfully developed
application, has been rewarded. They are now GOV2’s top supplier.

3.6

Case 6 (CON1)

CON1 (Case 6) operates with 10,000 staff in the health industry with pharmaceutical
manufacturing operations around the globe, pharmacy wholesaling, and national diagnostic
services. In 2003, it divested its hospitals operations, but continued to run medical centers.
CON1 frequently buys and sells businesses. In 2001, it had three suppliers [2] providing similar
IT services to three of its major businesses [1]. It believed this was uneconomical and selected
the most “culturally aligned” incumbent since it wanted a value-add commercial relationship
[7]. Most importantly, CON1 wanted consolidation and stability, hence the choice of a largescope [1], sole supplier [2] configuration. It went with a six-year deal [5] to get the right
financial outcome.
The flagship issue came in the third year of the contract. CON1’s structure was
radically different – centralized rather than decentralized, capital intensive rather than resource
intensive, operating in highly regulated industries requiring greater control, and only 10,000
staff remained from the 50,000 that existed at the onset. The fixed price [4] and longer initial
duration [5] has prevented the scaling down necessary. After this contract ends, the CIO
believes that backsourcing will be required due to the changes in the business, and also believes
that the financial scale will not be attractive enough “get the right price”.

3.7

Case 7 (CON2)

CON2 (Case 7) employs 10,000 people in 40 countries. It operates four distinct
businesses: mining services (explosives), fertilizer manufacturing, chemicals manufacturing,
and consumer products manufacturing and marketing. The push for outsourcing was to get rid
of non-core businesses. IT was considered non-core, thus all the data center resources [1] were
sold and contracted back.
Like MIN1, configuration was designed for the highest purchase price – sole supplier
[2], full scope [1], with all the resources transferring to the supplier [6]. Only one final offer
was received for the sale, although many offers came in to provide the services, but it came with
a high service fee. This was the supplier’s first client in the country (hence the offer for the data
center because they required the infrastructure).
Unfortunately, CON2 took the offer but never received the cash payment for the data
center – the purpose of the deal. CON2 was simply too distracted trying to manage the
transition. To get the payment, CON2 had to sign up for the two-year extension [5]. Once
‘free’, the incumbent was removed and the second generation was reconfigured to a best of
breed with three suppliers [2], as well as bringing ownership of server assets in-house [6].
Doing so resulted in a 70% cost saving.
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9

CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

The diversity of the ITO portfolios and the major ITO deals in the seven test cases was
striking. Each case used different configuration attribute options, each had different results, and
all were managed differently. The key was understanding and managing the chosen attributes
well.
Scope Grouping [1] worked in some aspects and did not in other aspects for all cases
except MAN1, for which all the attributes were poorly implemented and managed. SERV1’s
limited service scope minimized risk, but the full recipient scope without the commensurate
buy-in from the recipients curtailed the envisioned benefits. GOV1’s limitation of the scope of
the deal, without understanding the full scope required resulted in GOV1’s abdication of the
user support and education. This support is now consuming all of the IT resources planned for
strategic initiatives. MIN1’s full recipient scope has caused the deal to be in constant
renegotiation as each recipient tailors the deal to its needs. There are now effectively 50
contracts as opposed to one, albeit all with the same supplier.
Supplier Grouping [2] was the same in that it worked in some aspects and did not in
other aspects for all cases (except MAN1, whose sole supplier went bankrupt). For example,
the best of breed worked for SERV1 in locking in a price and reducing the number of suppliers,
but worked against SERV1 in implementation, as the business recipients wanted a panel to
engage in continuous competition. MIN1 had a sole supplier, but with 50 different
geographically based contracts, it has not been able to achieve the seamless global service
delivery it had wanted from the supplier due to inconsistent capabilities of the supplier coupled
with varying organizational requirements of each region. Nonetheless, economies and some
standardization have been achieved where possible. CON1’s move from a best of breed to a
sole supplier has enabled consistency and stability; however, CON1 was forced to have to train
the sole supplier in service operations for months when it became apparent that the supplier did
not have the required expertise.
Financial scale [3] helped all the cases get the prices they wanted, but worked against
them where the relative scale was large and poorly managed. MAN1’s CIO managed only
disputes for nearly a year as most of the relative spend was with the failing supplier. CON2 will
be forced into insourcing in the next generation as its financial scale has fallen dramatically
while its needs have become more specialized.
The Pricing Framework [4] worked for some cases and not for other cases. For
example, the fixed price worked very well for GOV2 and resulted in disaster for MAN1, the
difference being the degree to which the service provider could run at a loss. GOV1’s unit
pricing worked very well (price per notebook), but SERV1’s price per hour ran into problems
with a lack of understanding about what the supplier’s staff would be bringing besides labor as
the client wanted methodology as well.
Duration [5] for many worked well at the onset in getting a good price, but worked
against CON1 and CON2 when the businesses changed and neither had a way out of the
contract. No organization, however, now advocates a long fixed-term contract.
Resource Ownership [6] was differentiated by management– the first generation
supplier-owned resources in MAN1 and CON2 were badly managed, but the same options were
chosen for the second generation, managed well, and had superior results. In the cases where
the supplier provided predominately labor, SERV1 and GOV2, very different results occurred
depending on how the client managed the co-location. GOV2 wanted the service provider to
succeed and dedicated a relationship-orientated project manager. SERV1 expected the service
provider to bring much more than the labor it purchased (management and methodology as
well), and the mismanaged expectation gap resulted in the parties blaming one another for the
inevitable accountability conflicts.
The Commercial Relationship [7] again was differentiated by management. Cosourcing worked for GOV1 and not GOV2 due to the management of the option chosen and
whether the parties truly worked as a single team or not. The extreme nature arms-length of
MAN1 prevented the parties from discussing the extent of the supplier’s losses until the losses
were beyond repair. GOV1’s arms-length allowed the service provider to focus and deliver
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exceptionally well. The value-add component of both MIN1 and CON1 never materialized
because operational problems besieged all strategic initiatives, but is certainly an explicit goal
for the next generation as both intend to perform due diligence over any future service
providers’ operational and strategic capabilities, rather than assume either inherently exist.

5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

It is a mistake to treat all ITO arrangements as instances of the same phenomenon as
outsourcing involves a variety of choices that result in widely differing types and forms of
arrangements. ITO has moved from being a relatively straightforward concept to one that is a
complex aggregation of multiple options and permutations. As a result, extant literature takes
up disparate views as to what ITO actually is and labels various forms of ITO in widely variant
manners making research difficult to compare, and findings inconsistent or in conflict. As
outsourcing seems likely to continue to be a research genre within the IT literature, it needs to
be understood in a larger context so that studies can be more readily compared to one another,
and inconsistent findings explained. This study uses an ITO configuration taxonomy to
understand ITO in all its complexity and to enable comparison of very different outsourcing
arrangements under a general construct.
Future research possibilities are numerous and varied. First, given the inevitable
demand for prescriptions as to the ‘best ways’ of configuring ITO arrangements, it will be
interesting to see other researchers explore possible additions to the taxonomy and whether
particular combinations of configuration options are associated with desirable outcomes. This
suggests there are no easy answers. No case had the same overall configuration. The mix of
intent, the context for which the deal is being configured, and how well the deal is actually
resourced and managed, invariably combine in unique ways, making each total configuration
specific to its circumstances. In addition, Lee et al. (2004) recognized, in their study on
configuration fit, that disparate structures might result in different, yet equally desirable
outcomes. What seems to be critical, therefore, is for a management to have clarity regarding
the configuration attributes and how they fit together to meet their specific needs given the
prevailing context and resources that can be applied.
Miller (1996) portrayed 'fit' as "the fit amongst elements as evidenced by the degree to
which strategy, structure, and systems complement one another". Using this for ITO
configuration fit, it could be described as "the degree strategy, configuration, and management
systems complement one another". So, if an organization wants a high purchase price for a data
center, the configuration is typically designed to achieve that goal (large scope, scale, long
duration, full resource ownership by supplier, etc) to complement that strategy. The
management system needs to then be designed to fit the configuration. It is particularly the fit
between all the configuration attributes chosen and the management thereof that may lead to
success or failure.
It is imperative that organizations recognize the importance of congruence amongst
their outsourcing decisions and the need to make such decisions with full understanding of the
choices available and the unique management challenges each present– not just for the current
deals, but for future generations of those deals and the ITO portfolio as a whole.
None of the case organizations were found to understand the totality of the choices, nor
the impact of decisions made on other choices. Each organization considering outsourcing, or
embarking on its next generation, faces 26 configuration choices for each outsourcing deal.
Given this number and possible permutations, it is no wonder that advice regarding successful
outsourcing is in constant conflict.
The paper’s contributions are its demonstration that outsourcing is more about complex
choices than has ever been recognized in the prior literature, and that ITO configuration
structures offer explanations and insight into success and failure depending upon how the chose
configuration was managed by the client organization. It establishes that the taxonomy is
indeed useful to compare and contrast different outsourcing arrangements and that all attributes
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interact in such a way that individual attributes taken in isolation cannot offer sound
explanations of this complex phenomenom or prescriptions of success.

6
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